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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
HERSCHEL J. SAPERSTEIN,
Trustee in Bankruptcy of
the ESTATE OF WHEAT BROS.
PAINTERS & DECORATORS, a
partnership,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N. A., a corporation,

Case No.
11768

Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff seeks to set aside alleged preferential transfers of money under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,
claiming that defendant obtained money in violation of the
Act from Wheat Bros. Painters & Decorators, a partnership,
for which plaintiff is the trustee in bankruptcy.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried February 24, 1969, before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, sitting without a jury, subsequent to which a judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff
and against defendant for the sum of $27,331.25, together
with interest in the amount of $3,624.62, and costs. Defendant's motion to amend the findings, conclusions and decree
was denied on June 30, 1969.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court judgment,
claiming that no preferential transfers were effected which
could be voided or recovered by the trustee.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Wheat Bros., painters and decorators, was a partnership consisting of James L. Wheat, John Wheat and Joseph
Wheat (R. 47), which had been a customer of First Security
Bank since about 1950 (R. 74). During the months preceding the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the partnership
maintained a checking account at the Sugarhouse Office of
the Bank. The partnership also borrowed money from the
Bank from time to time.
On May 19, 1965, the Company signed a ninety day note
in favor of the Bank for $5,000.00 (Exhibit P-14). On or
about June 1, 1965, the Company submitted a financial statement to the Bank which showed assets of $95,342.00 and
liabilities of $16,000.00 (Exhibit D-15). On July 13, 1965,
the Company signed a second ninety day note for $5,000.00
(Exhibit P-14)
From August 9th through September 21st, the Company
had a continuous overdraft which became increasingly larger
until at the close of business on September 21st the Company
had an overdraft of $18,768.28 (Exhibit P-12). During the
period of the overdraft, officers of the Bank visited the
Company and also talked with the partners over the telephone concerning the overdraft. The Company reassured
the Bank that deposits would soon be forthcoming which
would more than cover the overdraft (Exhibit D-18). On

3

September 10th the Company made a deposit of $3,986.70
and on September 15th it made another deposit for $3,411.00
(Exhibit P-12).
After the close of business on September 21st, the Company made a deposit of $21,320.08 (Exhibit P-10). No conversations were held regarding the purpose or effect of that
deposit (R. 81). The bulk of that deposit was a check from
Jacobsen Construction Company for $18,150.00 (Exhibit
P-11). The next morning, September 22nd, the Bank endorsed the Jacobsen check for collection and sent it by messenger over to Zions Bank where a cashier's check was
obtained for the amount of the Jacobsen check (R. 82).
Thereafter, the Wheat Bros. deposit was automatically set
off against the overdraft giving Wheat Bros. a credit balance against which they drafted checks (R. 85-6).
On September 24th a deposit was made by the Company
for $997.56 and another deposit was made on September
29th for $3,283.03 (Exhibit P-12). On or about September
28th the Company submitted another financial statement to
the Bank. Although this financial statement presented a different picture to the Bank than had been seen previously,
the statement still showed assets of $68,800.00 and liabilities
of only $38,800.00 (Exhibit D-19, R. 104-5). During the
period of time from September 22nd to October 4th, the
Company continued to draw checks against their credit balance with the Bank.
On October 4, 1965, the Company made a deposit with
the Bank of $7,384.00, with no prior conversations regarding
the purpose of the deposit. Later on that same day, the Bank
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set off $5,131.25 against the note that had fallen due on
August 17, 1965 (R. 96). After that setoff, the Company
again had a credit balance against which it drafted checks.
Another deposit was made on October 8, 1965, of $3,696.38
(Exhibit P-12).
On October 14, 1965, John Wheat collapsed in the office
of the Company and was taken to the hospital where he remained for a period of one month (R. 53). The next day the
Wheat Bros.' payroll was due and upon checking, Joe Wheat
found insufficient funds in the bank account to pay the
employees. Therefore, Joe collected enough accounts receivables to meet the payroll and on October 18th made a
deposit of $4,153.48 to cover the payroll checks. The Bank
officers did not know of the purpose of the deposit, nor was
any arrangement made with respect thereto (R. 53-4). Later
that day, the Bank made a setoff of $4,050.00 against the
second note which had fallen due on October 11, 1965 (R.
97).
On October 19, 1965, Joe Wheat laid off all employees
and shut the Company down except for some minor jobs
which he finished himself. The next day, October 20th, Joe
and Jim Wheat went to the Bank to talk with Mr. Bentley
W. Vincent and Mr. Boyd A. Lindquist, the manager and
assistant manager, respectively, of the Sugarhouse Office.
Joe told Mr. Vincent that the Company had receivables of
$18,000.00 and debts of over $70,000.00 (R. 57).
On December 8, 1965, voluntary petitions in bankruptcy
were filed by Wheat Bros. Painters & Decorators, a partnership, and its three partners individually (Exhibit P-1
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through P-4). The partnership schedules in bankruptcy
show liabilities in the amount of $73,053.99 and assets in
the amount of $17,127.00 (Exhibit P-1).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A. THE DEPOSITS AND SETOFFS BETWEEN
WHEAT BROS. AND THE BANK DO NOT CONSTITUTE
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS UNDER SECTION 60
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
The most pertinent parts of Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act state:

"Section 60.

Preferred Creditors.

a. (1) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this
act, of any of the property of a debtor to or for the
benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent
debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent
and within four months before the filing by or against
him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this
Act, the effect of which transfer will be to enable such
creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
some other creditor of the same class.

*

*

*

*

*

"b. Any such preference may be avoided by the
trustee if the creditor receiving it or to be benefited
thereby or his agent acting with reference thereto has,
at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent."
Plaintiff alleged and the lower court held that the
deposits and setoffs were preferential transfers under Sec-
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tion 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. Appellant strongly urges
that such a holding is in error, and that this case clearly
comes under Section 68 (a) of the Act which is set forth
and discussed under Point B hereinafter. Therefore, defendant asserts that the elements of a preferential transfer
on which plaintiff relies are irrelevant in this case and
ought not to be considered.
As the Court is well aware, when a deposit is made
with a bank a relationship of debtor and creditor is created. Since the depositor owed the bank debts because of
the overdraft and overdue notes, a condition of mutual
debts was created between the Bank and the Bankrupt.
That brings the fact situation under Section 68 (a) and
not under Section 60. Had the bank not exercised its right
of setoff, the referee in bankruptcy would have been required to set off the mutual debts.
That Section 68 is the governing Section in this case
is clear from a statement found in 4 Collier on Bankruptcy
(14th Ed.) par. 60.15:
"The basic problem, however, becomes infinitely
more complex when the situation arises, as is often
the case, where the bank is a creditor of depositor and
the depositor is insolvent. Tested by the requirements
of Section 60, deposits made in the ordinary course of
business in such situations are not preferential transfers. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, there is
nothing in the Act which prevents an insolvent from
conducting his business in the usual way, or prohibits
banks from dealing with him on that basis. But a
complication arises due to the fact that Section 68 of
the Act permits a setoff in the case of Mutual Debits
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and Credits, and the use of this privilege, which in
reality effects a legal preference, by a creditor bank
in connection with the deposit of insolvent debtor obviously opens the way to an indirect accomplishment
of results generally prohibited by Section 60.
"In an effort to reconcile these provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act, and at the same time prevent abuse,
the courts have long since evolved a workable set of
principles. . . . Summarized briefly, it was well settled, prior to the Act of 1938, that deposits made in
the ordinary course of business generally upon an open
account and subject to withdrawal by check, were not
preferential transfers, even if made while the debtor
was insolvent and the bank had knowledge or notice
of the depositor's insolvency . ...
"The doctrine that banks could under certain conditions accept deposits of a known insolvent and yet
subsequently exercise the privilege of setoff gave rise
to criticism in some quarters. Consequently, when the
Act of 1938 was in its preliminary stages, certain
amendments to Section 68 were proposed which would
have altered the recognized rules. The amendments
were not adopted, however, when the bill was finally
enacted into law. Therefore, despite the fact that the
term 'transfer' under Section 60 now has a wider significance than formerly, and notwithstanding also that
Section 68 was extensively revised to strike down
preferences, whether effected directly or by remote
obscure devices, it is quite clear that there was no
intention to alter the accepted law as to make deposits.
"It has been suggested by one well known authority that while the principles relating to bank deposits
and bank setoffs are grounded in common-sense and
practical business policy, they can hardly be reconciled
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with the express terms of the Act. However, this may
be, the principles here stated and analyzed more fully
under Section 68 have the sanction of the overwhelming weight of authority and should still govern where
applicable." (emphasis added)
An annotation found at 85 ALR 369, 372 ( 1933) also
states that the general rule is that a bank setoff is not a
preference:
"The general rule is that the deposit by an insolvent, in a bank to which he is indebted, though within
four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,
is not a transfer of property amounting to a preference within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, so as
to preclude the bank's right of setoff accorded by the
act, provided the deposit is in the usual course of business, to the open or general account of the depositor,
subject to check (as subsequently shown, this rule applies even though the bank knows at the time that the
depositor is insolvent.)"
In the case of Citizens' National Bank vs. Lineberger,
45 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1930), the Court, after stating that
an ordinary deposit is not a "transfer" within the meaning
of the Bankruptcy Act, said:
"A deposit in a bank is not a sale or parting with
property, or its possession, as a payment, pledge, mortgage, gift, or security. It does not deplete the estate of
the depositor, but results in substituting for currency,
bank notes, checks, drafts, and other bankable items a
corresponding credit with the bank, which may be
checked against, and which provides the depositor with
the medium of exchange in universal use in the transaction of business. A deposit of funds differs from a
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payment in the essential particular that it is withdrawable at the will of the depositor. Of course, a deposit
may be made the cloak for some other transaction, such
as payment or the giving of security; and in such case
equity, which looks through form to substance, will
treat the transaction according to its real nature. But
if the deposit is in reality a deposit, made in good faith
as such, subject to the withdrawal of the depositor,
and not made as a cloak for a payment or other forbidden transaction, it is not a transfer within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act and cannot be attacked
as preferential, even though it may have been made
when the depositor was insolvent, and even though the
bank, by applying it as a setoff, may have obtained a
greater percentage on a debt which it holds against
its insolvent depositor than his other creditors can
obtain." Lineberger at 527-28
Appellant claims that the case of Hall vs. Rochester
Trust Co., 9 F. Supp. 797 (D.C.N.H. 1935), correctly states
the law as to when Section 68(a) is applicable as opposed
to Section 60 :
"It is true that if the deposits by the company had
been made in the defendant bank for the purpose of
creating a right of setoff or if there had been any collusion between the bankrupt and the bank to enable
the bank to receive a greater percentage of its debts
than any other unsecured creditor, then the transaction
might be held to create a preference under section 60a.
But such is not the fact in the instant case. I find there
was nothing unusual or out of the ordinary in the
transaction between the parties. They continued doing
business in the usual and ordinary way right up to the
time of the common-law assignment. The deposits
were not made for the purpose of giving the bank a
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preference and the bank had no reasonable cause to
believe that the Leavitt Company was insolvent to the
extent that it would not continue to meet its obligations.
"I hold that the bank was within its rights when
it on November 4, 1932, charged the bankrupt's account with $3, 718.52, and that the case is governed by
section 68a of the Bankruptcy Act and not by section
60a as New York County Bank v. Massey, supra; In re
Scherzer (D.C.) 130 F. 631; In re Myers (D.C.) 99
F. 691; Toof v. City National Bank of Paducah (C.C.
A.) 206 F. 250." Hall at 800.
In the case on appeal, the Court should apply Section
68 (a) and not Section 60. The record evidences absolutely
no collusion between the Bank and the Company. The Bank
clearly had a right to set off the deposits it received from
the bankrupt, and such setoff is governed by Section 68 (a).
POINT I.
B. UNDER SECTION 68(a) OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT, THE BANK HAD A RIGHT TO SETOFF THE
DEPOSITS MADE BY WHEAT BROS. AGAINST THE
DEBTS OWED BY WHEAT BROS. TO THE BANK.

Section 68 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that:
a. In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall be set off
against the other, and the value only shall be allowed
or paid.
The rule that a bank may set off deposits against debts
owed to it by the depositor is clear and supported by the
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great weight of authority. When Wheat Bros. made deposits on September 21, October 4 and on October 18, the
Bank was within its rights to set these deposits off against
the overdraft and notes that were owing to the bank.
Collier, who is considered the foremost expert on bankruptcy, states that:
"The general rule may first be stated that where an
insolvent debtor makes general deposits within four
months of his bankruptcy, which deposits are accepted
in good faith and in the regular course of business, the
bank has a right to set off such deposits against an
obligation owing to it by the debtor ...
It is only where affairs have reached such a point that
the bank accepts the deposits for the purpose of payment, or of giving itself a subsequent advantage over
other creditors through its right of setoff, or for some
other special purpose, that the deposit and the subsequent application of it amounts to a reasonable preference. 4 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) par. 68.16.

Another text states that the deposit is the key factor
in the allowability of a setoff and not the setoff.
The right of setoff existing under the Bankruptcy Act
raises some peculiar questions of preference in the case
of deposits in a bank which holds obligations of the
depositor. It is the making of the deposit, and not the

subsequent application of it by way of setoff to the
debt of the bank, that constitutes the preference, if
any, under the Bankruptcy Act.

A deposit in the usual course of business in good faith
to the open or general account of the depositor, subject
to his check, does not result in a preferential transfer,
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notwithstanding it may place the bank in position, in
the event of the depositor's bankruptcy, to set off the
deposit against his debt to the bank. The rule applies
to a deposit made subject to the collection of the different items thereof if the intent at the time of the
deposit was that checks against it would be honored
when the items were collected. The principal reason
which the courts have assigned for the rule is that
when a deposit is made under the circumstances indicated, there is no diminution of the depositor's estate,
since he thereby receives an equivalent credit, which is
immediately available to him. 9 Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy Sec. 525 (1963). (emphasis added)
That the deposits were made in the usual course of
business will be discussed under Point II.
There are many cases wherein the court has upheld
a bank's right to a setoff under Section 68. Perhaps the
most frequently cited case is the United States Supreme
Court case of New York County National Bank vs. Massey,
192 U.S. 138, 48 L.Ed. 380 (1904). In that case the Court
specifically approved a setoff by the bank from a depositor's account, to pay part of an overdue note. The Court
held that the setoff was not a voidable transfer, and that
it was a permissible setoff under Section 68 of the Act.
The following statements are of importance:
"As we have seen, a deposit of money to one's
credit in a bank does not operate to diminish the estate
of the depositor, for when he parts with the money he
creates at the same time, on the part of the bank, an
obligation to pay the amount of the deposit as soon as
the depositor may see fit to draw a check against it.
It is not a transfer of property as a payment, pledge,
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mortgage, gift, or security. It is true that it creates a
debt, which, if the creditor may set it off under Section
68, amounts to permitting a creditor of that class to
obtain more from the bankrupt's estate than creditors
who are not in the same situation, and do not hold any
debts of the bankrupt subject to set-off. But this does
not, in our opinion, operate to enlarge the scope of the
statute defining preferences so as to prevent set-off
in cases coming within the terms of Section 68a.

*

*

*

*

*

"It is true, as we have seen, that in a sense the
bank is permitted to obtain a greater percentage of
its claim against the bankrupt than other creditors of
the same class, but this indirect result is not brought
about by the transfer of property within the meaning
of the law. There is nothing in the findings to show
fraud or collusion between the bankrupt and the bank
with a view to create a preferential transfer of the
bankrupt's property to the bank, and in the absence
of such showing we cannot regard the deposit as having other effect than to create a debt to the bankrupt,
and not a diminution of his estate." Massey at 147.

We submit that the case at bar falls directly within
the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court
in the Massey case. A very similar holding is given by the
Supreme Court in Studley vs. Boylston National Bank of
Boston, 229 U.S. 523, 57 L. Ed. 1313 (1913), where the
Court again specifically approved setoffs by a bank within
four months before bankruptcy and declared them not to
be voidable transfers.
"For there is nothing in the statute which deprives a bank, with whom an insolvent is doing business, of the rights of any other creditor taking money

14
without reasonable cause to believe that a preference
will result from the payment. The Bankruptcy Act
contemplates that by remaining in business and at
work, an insolvent may become able to pay off his
debts. It does not prevent him from continuing in
trade, depositing money in bank, drawing checks and
paying debts as they mature, either to his own bank or
any other creditor." Studley at 526.
The case of White vs. Pacific Southwest Trust & Savings Bank, (9 F.2d 650 (D.C.S.O. Cal. 1926), contains a
rather extensive discussion on many factors of bankruptcy
law in a case where disgruntled creditors were attempting
to set aside a court approved agreement under which two
banks were permitted to retain funds received by them
from the setoff of the bankrupt's accounts, even though
the banks had been parties to creditors' agreements during
a period of insolvency. The Court did not require the banks
to return the money, stating as law:

"It must be conceded that it is clearly established
by the authorities that, where deposits are made by a
depositor in good faith in the regular course of business, and not for the purpose of enabling the bank to
secure a preference, the bank has a right to set off a
deposit against a claim held by it against a depositor
who subsequently becomes a bankrupt. Collier on
Bankruptcy (13th Ed.) p. 1612; New York County National Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 199, 48
L. Ed. 380. And the bank's right to set-off in such
cases is not defeated because it has knowledge or notice
of the insolvency of its depositor. In re Wright-Dana
Hardware Co. (D.C.) 207 F. 636; New York County
National Bank v. Massey, supra; Studley, etc., v.
Boylston Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 33 S. Ct. 806, 57 L. Ed.
1313." White at 658.

15
In another interesting case the Court sustained the
validity of two setoffs by two banks who were approached
by an admittedly insolvent customer, and one bank said it
would follow the lead of the other in deciding whether to
extend new credit. Instead, both banks set off against overdue accounts the funds on deposit in the customer's checking account. Because the testimony proved that the deposits
had been made in the regular course of business and not
fraudulently and collusively for the purpose of giving the
bank an unlawful preference, there was no reason to hold
the setoffs to be voidable preferences. No attempt had
been made to build up the balances and no restrictions
had been placed on the withdrawal thereof, according to
the Court. Also of importance was the following:
"It is firmly established that the act of a bank in
taking over the deposit of a bankrupt and setting it off
against his debt to the bank under Section 68 is not a
transfer within the meaning of the other sections ref erred to, provided the deposits were made in good
faith and not as a cloak for a payment or other forbidden transaction.
"But if the deposit is in reality a deposit, made in
good faith as such, subject to the withdrawal of the
depositor, and not made as a cloak for a payment or
other forbidden transaction it is not a transfer within
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act and cannot be attacked as preferential, even though it may have been
made when the depositor was insolvent, and even
though the bank, by applying it as a set-off, may have
obtained a greater percentage on a debt which it holds
against, its insolvent depositor than his other creditors
can obtain See also Kane v. First National Bank, 5
Cir., 56 F.2d 534, 85 A.L.R. 362; Cusick v. Second Na-
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tional Bank, 73 App. D.C. 16, 115 F.2d 150." Hughes
vs. Machen 164 F.2d 983, 986-87 (4th Cir. 1947).
In the case of Jandrew vs. Guaranty State Bank of
Ovilla, Texas, 294 F. 530 (5th Cir. 1923), the Court allowed
the debtor to pay off a note owed to the bank by a check
drawn on its deposits at the bank. The Court reasoned that
under Section 68 the trustee would be required to do after
bankruptcy what the bank and the depositor had done before bankruptcy.
"The bankruptcy Act itself would do what the
parties voluntarily did, had they omitted to do it. What
the payment of the check transferred to the bank was
only what the bank would have obtained as against
other creditors of the same class, upon the filing of the
petition, through the obligation of the trustee to apply
the deposit to the payment of the notes in stating the
account between the bank and the bankrupt. The payment of the check could have no effect to give the bank
a greater percentage of its debt than other creditors
of its class, since it would receive through payment by
check only what the Bankruptcy Act would give it,
though no such payment had been made to it. As the
payment of the check was not a preferential payment,
but merely a voluntary accomplishment of an off set,
which was provided for by the Bankruptcy Act in the
absence of voluntary action, we see no reason for disallowing the offset because the parties anticipated the
action of the law even though the bankrupt was then
insolvent within the knowledge of the bank." Jandrew
at 531.
In the case of Farmer's Bank of Clinton, Mo. v. Julian,
383 F.2d. 314 (8th Cir. 1967), the bank set off a deposit
of $9,733.88 against $16,000.00 owed the bank. The amount
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set off was in a general checking account used in the ordinary course of business by the bankrupt. In allowing the
setoff the Court said :
"Section 68 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 108 applies and allows a setoff to the Bank unless the
account has been accepted or built up for the real purpose of permitting the Bank to obtain a preference
by way of setoff of the account. A bank account at the
time of filing the petition in bankruptcy is a debt due
to the bankrupt from the bank, and in the absence of
fraud or collusion between the bank and the bankrupt,
the bank may set the account off against any indebtedness owed by the bankrupt.
"The issue is : Was the account of the bankrupt
built up, with the understanding of the Bank, for the
purpose of allowing the Bank to use it as an offset and
thereby obtain a preference?" Julian at 324.
In addressing itself to this issue the Court held that
the referee was in error in concluding that the account
had been built up so that a setoff could be made even though
the account went from a balance of $34.84 to $11,197.14
in four days. The Court noted that the account was an
active one and that checks were paid between the deposits.
The bankrupt had testified that he had made no effort
to build up the account or to make deposits other than to
cover checks and that the deposits were made in the usual
course of business. The Court also said :
"The Bank on the same day had already honored
a number of checks totaling some $1,400.00. This evidence clearly indicates that there was no collusive
build-up of the bank account and that the Bank only
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decided to make the setoff on the day the setoff was
actually executed. The refusal of Commercial Credit
to proceed with the long-term capital loan triggered
the Bank's decision to avail itself of its setoff right.
The pattern of deposits and withdrawals throughout
the month is fairly uniform and is certainly in line
with the normal business operation of the bankrupt.
"The fact that checks were outstanding against
the account at the time of setoff negatives any intent
on Woody's part to build up the account for the purpose of setoff, and there is absolutely no evidence of
any collusive or pre-arranged plan of action between
Woody and the Bank to build up this account." Julian
at 325.
Defendant submits that the Julian case is very much
in point with the case on appeal. The Bank paid Wheat
Bros. checks before each of the deposits in question. The
account was an active one. There is no evidence of a collusive build-up of the account so that the Bank could make
a setoff; in fact, the Bank did not know deposits would be
made until they were brought into the Bank. The deposits
were made in the regular course of business to cover checks
with no thought of a build-up. Furthermore, the Bank only
decided to make the setoff on the day it was made with
the exception of the overdraft which was automatically set
off. In short, there is absolutely no evidence of any collusive or prearranged plan between Wheat Bros. and the
Bank.
The Julian case and the numerous other cases cited by
defendant conclusively show that the case on appeal falls
under Section 68 (a) and not Section 60. Therefore, since
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plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof in showing
collusion or a pre-arrangement, the setoffs must be allowed
to stand.
POINT II.
THE DEPOSITS MADE BY WHEAT BROS. WERE
MADE IN GOOD FAITH AND IN THE REGULAR
COURSE OF BUSINESS.
The cases and other authorities that refer to a bank's
right of setoff under Section 68 (a) state in various language that the deposit must be made in good faith; made
in the regular or ordinary course of business ; made to deposi tor's open or general account; deposit subject to his
check; made without fraud or collusion between depositor
and bank; intended as a deposit and not as a payment to
the bank, etc. See, e.g., Rector v. Commercial Nat. Bank,
200 U. S. 420, 50 L. Ed. 533 (1906); Kane v. First Nat.
Bank, 56 F. 2d 534 (5th Cir., 1932); and Hughes v.
Machen, 164 F. 2d 983 (4th Cir., 1947).
The appellant contends that the deposits were made in
good faith by Wheat Bros. and in the regular course of
business. There is absolutely no evidence whatever of any
collusion or fraud between the Bank and Wheat Bros. to
allow a preference.
Although the Bank had been in contact with Wheat
Bros. prior to the deposit of September 21, 1965, because
of the overdraft, the deposit was still made in the regular
course of business. The Company had been depositing its
payments for work completed with the Bank since 1952.
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The deposit was made in the same way the Company always
made deposits with the Bank, and there was nothing said
about the deposit at the time it was made. The Bank did
not have prior notice of any of the deposits in question,
nor did the Bank have any intent to prefer itself over any
other creditors. The clearing of an overdraft is an automatic process which required no decision on the part of
the Bank. After the overdraft was cleared, Wheat Bros.
was left with a credit balance against which it drafted
checks.
In the trial court the appellee sought to show that the
deposit was not in the regular course of business because
the Jacobsen check, which was part of the September 21st
deposit, was given special handling. Such handling is irrelevant to this point. The law requires that the deposits be
made in good faith and in the regular course of business.
The law says nothing about the collecting of deposits. The
decision to give the Jacobsen check special handling was
made after the deposit because of the size of the check, and
was not related to receipt of the deposit.
In the case of Wilson v. Citizens' Trust Co., 233 F. 697
(D.C.S.D. Geo. 1916), the Court had to answer the question as to whether a bank, which was aware of the depositor's insolvency, could draw a check on the bankrupt's
acoount to setoff the deposit against debts owed to the bank.
In dealing with that question the Court held that it was
the making of the deposit, and not the subsequent application of the same by way of setoff to the debt of the bank,
that constituted the preference, if any, under the Bankruptcy Act.
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It is submitted by an appellant that the abuse the

Bankruptcy Act is trying to guard against is agreements
by banks and insolvent depositors whereby the insolvent
depositor makes a deposit with the intent to give the bank
a preference. There is no evidence of such intent shown
here on the part of Wheat Bros.
That the deposits of October 4th and October 18th
were made in good faith and in the regular course of business is also very clear. Between September 10th and October 18th, Wheat Bros. made eight separate deposits totaling $48,232.23. The Bank did not know in advance that
any one of the deposits would be made, nor had the Bank
made arrangements with the Company for any of the deposits to be made. Each of the deposits was made in good
faith by the Company with the intent to draw checks
against them, and, in fact, the Bank paid all Wheat Bros.'
checks up until September 20th and thereafter the Bank
paid all Wheat Bros.' checks drafted against a credit balance.
Concerning the deposit of October 18th, Joe Wheat's
testimony clearly shows that the deposit was made specifically with the intent of meeting a payroll.
In the case of McGuigan v. Dime Bank Title & Trust
Co., 47 F.2d. 760 (2nd Cir. 1931), the bank had set off
$38,994.09 against debts that the bankrupt owed the bank.
The setoff was made the same day that the deposit was
made, and, at the time of the setoff the bank was aware of
depositor's insolvency. In holding that the bank had a right
of setoff, the Court said:
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"The depositor, the Whitenight's, Inc. was indebted to the bank, and the bank had the right to set off
its debt to the depositor, arising by the deposit, against
the debt the depositor owed it, and it makes no difference whether the deposit was one day old or one year
old, or whether checks to the order of other creditors
had been honored by the bank or not. The bank did
only what it had a right to do, and should do." (emphasis added)

*

*

*

*

*

"The right of setoff is given by the Bankruptcy
Act itself, and the test in cases where the right of setoff by a bank is questioned is always whether, after
insolvency, the money was deposited for the purpose of
enabling the bank to secure a preference. If not, the
setoff should be made. New York County National
Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 199, 48 L. Ed.
380. The statement of claim in this case contains no
averment to the effect that the deposits were made for
the purpose of enabling the bank to secure a preference. Therefore, the setoff was properly and legally
made, and did not constitute a preference which may
be recovered by the trustee."
"In Studley, Trustee, v. Boylston National Bank,
229 U.S. 523, page 527, 33 S. Ct. 806, 808, 51 L. Ed.
1313, Mr. Justice Lamar said, in delivering the opinion of the court :
" 'The money so deposited was the proceeds of the
sale of tickets to a large party of round-the-world
tourists, and was put in bank, not for the purpose of
preferring it, but in the expectation of being used for
carrying on the business in the future as in the past.
Indeed, the payments were made with the statement
that the company would expect the Bank to discount
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other notes. We find nothing in the record to indicate
that the deposits were made for the purpose of enabling the bank to secure a preference by the exercise of
the right of set-off. The case, therefore, comes directly
within the decision in New York County Nat. Bank v.
Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 199, 48 L. Ed. 380,
where $3,884 deposited by an insolvent customer, in
good faith, four days before the filing of the petition
against him, was allowed to the bank by way of set-off
on notes of the bankrupt held by it.'" McGuigan at 762
The case on appeal falls within the language of the
McGuigan case. The setoffs were made the same day as
the deposit and there is no proof that the deposits were
made with the purpose of enabling the bank to secure a
preference.
In the case of In re Empire Flooring Co. 43 F. 2d. 748
(D.C.W.D. Pa. 1930), the Court said that:
"Therefore, unless the trustee is in a position to
show that the bank balance at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy had been created with a special
purpose of giving a preference to the bank, the bank
would legally be entitled to have a set-off." Empire
Flooring at 749.
In the case of In re Wright-Dana Hardware Co., 212 F.
397 (2nd Cir. 1914), the Court held that the right of a bank
to apply a deposit on a debt due it within four months before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy cannot be denied
upon a mere suspicion or bare inference that it had reasonable cause to believe that a preference would be effected.
"And the court declared in its opinion that there
was no evidence, unless by inference, that bankruptcy
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was contemplated, or that any preference was intended
by the company, prior to January 1, 1912. We think
that as to the set-offs thus allowed, the court below
was right in sustaining them, as it was not made to
satisfactorily appear that the bank had reasonable
cause to believe, at the time they were made, that a
preference would be thereby effected. The right of
the bank to make the set-offs made prior to January
1, 1912, cannot be denied upon a mere suspicion or a
bare inference. If courts were to proceed so to administer the law, banks could not safely do business with
insolvents. The intention of the act that insolvency
should not deprive one of his right to remain in business would be destroyed in large part, and bankruptcy
in many cases would be precipitated, if the courts
should, upon slight inferences, deny the right of setoff." Wright-Dana Hardware at 402. (emphasis added)
POINT III.
THE BANK'S RIGHT OF SETOFF APPLIES TO
OVERDRAFTS AS WELL AS TO OVERDUE NOTES.
The majority of cases which deal with a bank's right
of setoff under Section 68 (a) involve a setoff by the bank
against notes the bank is holding. However, the principles
of setoff also apply where the depositor has an overdraft
with the bank.
The case of Tomlinson v. Bank of Lexington, 145 F. 824
(4th Cir. 1906), is factually similar to the case on appeal.
In that case a partnership owed the bank about $13,000.00
in notes, and for about two years preceding bankruptcy,
the company had carried an overdraft with the bank to
pay for the day-to-day expenses of running the business.
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The bank and the company had a distinct understanding
and agreement that the next succeeding deposits would discharge the overdraft. The bank allowed the overdrafts "because of the promise of the company to deposit the proceeds
of certain good accounts held by the company to the payment of the overdraft."
The Court held that the bank did not receive a voidable
preference by permitting the customer to overdraw its
checking account on the express agreement that the customer would assign good accounts for collection to pay the
overdrafts. The Court stated:
The transfer, too, was made as found by the referee,
not only in the regular and due course of business, but
on a distinct understanding and agreement to that effect. It should be borne in mind none of these overdrafts or the proceeds of assigned accounts were credited on the bank debt of $13,100, evidenced by notes
endorsed by Montcastle and Ward, officers of the bank,
but were credited on the overdrafts permitted under
the express agreement; "a fair exchange of values,''
as expressed in Cook v. Tullis, 18 Wall. 332, 21 L. Ed.
933, "which may be made at any time even if one of
the parties is insolvent." Tomlinson at 828.
It is to be noted in connection with the rule of the Bank
of Lexington case that Wheat Bros. began incurring overdrafts in 1964. In September of 1965 the Bank contacted
the Company and was assured that receivables would soon
be forthcoming from Jacobsen Construction and others.
Thereupon the Bank contacted those from whom the Company claimed money was owed and merely confirmed that
fact.
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In the case of Steere v. Stockyards Nat. Bank, 266 s.
W. 531 (Tex. 1924), the bankrupt had maintained an aecount with the bank for more than three years prior to
bankruptcy. The bankrupt was often allowed to draw
checks which caused overdrafts which were subsequently
paid by deposits. At one point within four months of bankruptcy the bankrupt had an overdraft of over $45,000. At
that point the bank president called the bankrupt to inquire for information. The bank was told that a large deposit would soon be made, and, in fact, a few days later,
a deposit in excess of the overdraft was made. Thereafter,
the bankrupt's checks were honored until the bank learned
of the insolvency. The Court held that the bank had a right
to apply the deposits to the overdraft and that such application did not amount to an undue preference. The Court
in so ruling said :
The same case is authority for the conclusion that the
mere fact that an overdraft, or overdrafts, from time
to time may occur in a depositor's account, does not
amount to notice either of his insolvency or of the trust
character of the fund deposited. Steere at 535.
"The general rule is well settled that when a depositor
is indebted to a bank, the bank may apply his deposits,
or such portion thereof as may be necessary, to the
payment of his indebtedness; unless there be an agreement to the contrary, or unless the deposit be specially
applicable to some other particular purpose, or unless
the bank has notice that the funds do not belong to
the customer. This right to apply the deposit to the
customer's indebtedness is called the banker's lien, or
right of setof f, and does not depend upon the customer's assent. Instances of its application are most frequently found in the case of antecedent debts. We have
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found no case holding that the consent of the customer
was a prerequisite of the bank's right to assert its
lien." Steere at 536.
In the case of American Bank of Alaska v. Johnson,
245 F. 312 (9th Cir. 1917), the bankrupt would alternately
have an overdraft and then clear it with a deposit. At the
time of the transaction in question, the bankrupt owed the
bank $13,000 on notes and $4,096.14 on an overdraft. The
bankrupt then made a deposit of $3,750.14 in gold dust
which the bank setoff against the overdraft. The Court
allowed the setoff even though the bank had often asked
the bankrupt about the overdraft. The Court said:
The transaction established the relationship of debtor
and creditor. There having been a general deposit in
course of business when the credit was made, the bank
had a right to set off the notes and to dismiss the overdraft. Cumberland Glass Co. v. De Witt, 237 U. S.
447, 35 Sup. Ct. 636, 59 L. Ed. 1042; In re WrightDana Hardware Co., 212 Fed. 397, 129 C. C. A. 73.

*

*

*

*

*

There is no showing of fraud in the transaction. The
bank had paid checks for the half month preceding
July 31st, when the firm was owing the bank a considerable amount, and, although the officers were solicitous about the account, they had no reasonable ground
to believe that the condition of the firm was desperate,
or that it would not be able to go on with its mining.
Johnson at 315.
The appellant readily admits that it was desirous of
having Wheat Bros.' overdrafts cleared, as were the banks
in the cases cited above, and that it did contact some of
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Wheat Bros.' debtors to ascertain if funds would be forthcoming, but it is strongly contended that such concern and
caution does not take the deposits out of the ordinary course
of business.
Section 68 (a) makes no distinction between notes or
overdrafts as far as its right of setoff is concerned.
POINT IV
A. THE BANK DID NOT KNOW OR HAVE REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT WHEAT BROS. WAS
INSOLVENT AT THE TIME THE DEPOSITS WERE
MADE.
The lower court found that, "at the time of each of
the transfers above referred to, the defendant had reasonable cause to believe that Wheat Bros. was insolvent," and
also that, "at the time of each of said transfers, the defendant knew that Wheat Bros. was insolvent." It is appellant's
contention that the findings of the lower court are not
supported by the facts of this case. The appellant certainly
did not know that Wheat Bros. was insolvent nor did they
have reasonable cause to believe such.
Under Section 1(18) of the Bankruptcy Act, a person
is insolvent if the " ... aggregate of his property ... shall
not in a fair valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his
debts." Against this definition we measure the knowledge
of the Bank.
It is well to keep in mind that Wheat Bros. had been

a good customer of the Bank since 1950. On February 24,
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1964, Wheat Bros. submitted a financial statement to the
Bank which showed total assets of $59,845.00 and total
liabilities of only $2,050.00. On June 1, 1965, Wheat Bros.
submitted another financial statement to the Bank which
showed assets of $95,342.00 and liabilities of $16,000.00
(Exhibit D-15). While it is true that Wheat Bros. had a
continual overdraft with the Bank from the period of
August 9, 1965 to September 22, 1965, the Bank had enough
confidence in Wheat Bros. that none of their checks were
returned with the exception of two checks written to Granite National Bank, one being for the amount of $5,000.00,
the other for interest on that sum, which were returned
on September 20, 1965. The checks were returned only because of the amount of money involved and the fact that
such debt had not been listed on the financial statement of
June 1, 1965 (R. 79). On September 9, 1965, Wheat Bros.
made a deposit of $3,900.00, against which they drafted
checks. Then, on September 21, 1965, the Company made
a deposit of $21,320.00, the bulk of which was the Jacobsen
Construction Company check for $18,150.00. Therefore, at
the time of the September 21st deposit, the Company had
a fairly substantial overdraft and an overdue note for
$5,000.00. However, it must be kept in mind that the Bank
had checked with Jacobsen Construction Company and
knew that the funds would be forthcoming from Jacobsen
(R. 108). The Bank also relied on the fact that Wheat
Bros. was a long standing customer and upon the financial
statements which the Company had submitted to the Bank
over a period of time.
After the deposit of September 22nd was set off against
the overdraft, Wheat Bros. had a credit balance and drafted
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checks against that balance. On September 24th and again
on September 29th, Wheat Bros. made fairly substantial
deposits to the Bank, against which they also drafted checks.
Then, on October 4th Wheat Bros. made a deposit of
$7,384.00, against which the Bank set off the amount of
$5,131.25 for a note that was then overdue to the Bank.
On October 8th, the Company made a deposit of $3,696.38,
against which the Bank made no setoff. On October 18th
'
the Company made a deposit of $4,153.48, against which
a setoff was made of $4,050.00 against a note which was
also overdue at that time.
The few days surrounding that last transaction are
vital. The testimony of Mr. Joe Wheat was to the effect
that when his brother, John, who had been keeping the
books ended up in the hospital, he began searching around
to determine the financial condition of the partnership. Of
critical importance is the fact that one of the partners
himself did not know of the detailed financial condition
until he had thoroughly searched the records (R. 53, 56,
67). He made a deposit in the Bank on October 18th which
he intended to utilize for payment of payroll checks, but
as was mentioned above, the Bank exercised its right of
setoff because no arrangement had been made for the use
of the money for special purposes and the Bank was not
advised in advance of the impending deposit (R. 54). When
Joe Wheat first visited the Bank during that week, the
Bank advised him of the information it had received from
John Wheat regarding the financial condition of the Company. Two days later and after receipt and application of
the October 18th deposit, Joe brought to the Bank the books
and records of the Company which evidenced some financial
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problems. It was on October 20th, two days after the l,ast
setoff, that the Bank first learned of the sad financial condition of Wheat Bros. (R. 62, 64). Up until that time, it
had been relying in good faith and with good cause on the
financial statements that Wheat Bros. had submitted to the
Bank. The discovery of serious financial trouble was as
much a surprise to the Bank as it was to Joe Wheat. The
fact that the bankers discussed at that time various alternative insolvency proceedings does not in the least suggest
that the bankers had knowledge of insolvency at an earlier
time.
Even during the months prior to September 21st, the
inquiries of the Bank resulted in favorable information regarding Wheat Bros.' financial condition. On September 2,
1965, the Bank received information from John Wheat regarding the accounts receivable from three contractors and
confirmed receivables with all of them (Exhibit D-18, R.
102). The Dun & Bradstreet report confirmed the fact that
the business continued to operate on a profitable basis with
work capital restricted because of difficulty in collection
of accounts receivable (Exhibit D-17). The Bank knew of
that precise problem and for that reason extended credit
from time to time because of the expectation of subsequent
collection of the accounts receivable. The end result of all
available financial information would be that Wh·eat Bros.
had large accounts receivables which exceeded the obligations due and the Bank could not, even if under a duty to
do so, have discovered the full extent of the accounts payable which were subsequently listed in the bankruptcy petitions. The books of account themselves did not reflect the
accounts payable (Exhibits P-7, P-8; R. 50, 51, 64).

32

The appellant vigorously denies that it knew that
Wheat Bros. was insolvent at the time of any one of the
three deposits in question. It likewise denies that it had
reasonable cause to suspect that Wheat Bros. was insolvent.
At the very most, some of these circumstances surrounding
the deposits and some of the activities of the Company may
have caused the Bank to become somewhat dubious concerning the ability of the Company to meet its current
debts, but no facts were evident which would suggest insolvency. However, it is widely held that mere suspicion
of insolvency is not the same as knowing of insolvency or
having reasonable cause to believe that someone is insolvent.
Am. Jur. states the general rule:
Reasonable cause to believe is not the equivalent of
actual knowledge or actual belief. It is sufficient to
satisfy this element that the creditor have such knowledge or be put upon notice of such facts and circumstances as would incite a person of reasonable prudence
under similar circumstances to make inquiry as to the
financial condition of the debtor. Facts which are
sufficient to put such a man upon inquiry charge the
creditor with all the knowledge he could have acquired
by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Mere cause to
suspect the debtor's insolvency, however, is not the
equivalent of reasonable cause to believe him to be insolvent. A mere suspicion in the creditor's mind is insufficient to put him upon inquiry concerning the financial condition of the debtor or charge him with
notice that the debtor is insolvent. 9 Am. Jur.2d Bankruptcy Sec. 1083 (1963).
The case of McDonald v. Lawson, 356 P. 2d 1041 (Wyo.
1960), states the general rule that mere suspicion is not
sufficient to charge the creditor with knowledge of insolvency. That Court said:
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All the cases agree that it is not enough that a creditor
have some cause to suspect insolvency but he must
have knowledge of facts to induce him to believe that
his debtor is insolvent. A case often cited is Grant v.
National Bank, 97 U.S. 80, 81, 24 L. Ed. 791, where
the Supreme Court of the United States stated:
". . . It is not enough that a creditor has some cause
to suspect the insolvency of his debtor; but he must
have such a knowledge of facts as to induce a reasonable belief of his debtor's insolvency, in order to invalidate a security taken for his debt. To make mere
suspicion a ground of nullity in such a case would
render the business transaction of the community altogether too insecure. It was never the intention of
the framers of the act to establish any such rule. A
man may have many grounds of suspicion that his
debtor is in failing circumstances, and yet have no
cause for a well-grounded belief of the fact. He may
be unwilling to trust him further; he may feel anxious
about his claim, and have a strong desire to secure it,
-and yet such belief as the act requires may be wanting. Obtaining additional security, or receiving payment of a debt, under such circumstances is not
prohibited by the law. Receiving payment is put in the
same category, in the section referred to, as receiving
security. Hundreds of men constantly continue to
make payments up to the very eve of their failure,
which it would be very unjust and disastrous to set
aside. And yet this could be done in a large proportion
of cases if mere grounds of suspicion of their solvency
were sufficient for the purpose."

In Gray v. Little, 97 Cal. App. 442, 275 P. 870, 871,
872, the court succinctly stated some of the principles
applicable as follows:

34
"The fact alone that a creditor knows his debtor to
be financially embarrassed and is pressing for a payment of his claim is not sufficient to charge him with
having reasonable cause to believe his debtor to be insolvent. Sharpe v. Allender (C.C.A.) 170 F. 589; Page
v. Moore, (D.C.), 179 F. 988. Mere suspicion that the
debtor may be insolvent is not sufficient to render payments received by a creditor voidable as preference,
but he must have such knowledge of facts as to induce
a reasonable belief of insolvency. Bassett v. Evans ( C.
C.A.) 253 F. 532; City National Bank of Columbus v.
Slocum (C.C.A.) 272 F. 11; Homan v. Hirsch, 106 Or.
98, 211 P. 795. It is not enough that a creditor has
cause to suspect the insolvency of the debtor, but he
must have such a knowledge of facts as to induce a
reasonable belief of his debtor's insolvency, in order
to invalidate a security taken for his debt. Grant v.
National Bank, 97 U.S. 80, 81, 24 L. Ed. 971; In re
Campion et al. (D.C.) 256 F. 902. In the case last cited
the court said that the burden is on the trustee in
bankruptcy to show that the creditor to whom the
transfer was made shortly before bankruptcy had
reason to believe that a preference would result. The
trustee has failed to sustain this burden in this
case...."
See further In re Solof, 9 Cir., 2 F. 2d 130; In re Salmon, 2 Cir., 249 F. 300; Cate v. Certainteed Products
Corporation, 23 Cal. 2d 444, 144 P. 2d 335." McDonald
at 1044.
At most, appellant had mere suspicion of Wheat Bros.'
inability to pay its debts as they matured. Nothing in the
record shows that the Bank had reason to doubt the excess
of Wheat Bros. assets over its liabilities as clearly expressed
in the financial information available to the Bank.
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POINT IV.
B. EVEN IF THE BANK KNEW OR HAD REASON
TO KNOW OF WHEAT BROS.' INSOLVENCY, SUCH
FACT IS IRRELEVANT IN THIS CASE.
Notwithstanding the argument made in Point IV A,
supra, and notwithstanding that appellant strongly denies
that it had reason to suspect that Wheat Bros. was insolvent, it is submitted that such knowledge or suspicion of insolvency would make no difference in the outcome of this
case.
The general rule is :
"The fact alone that the bank, at the time of the making
of the deposit, knows that the depositor is insolvent
or in financial difficulties will not affect its right of
setoff. The mere fact that at the time a bank applies
a depositor's balance on his indebtedness to it, the
bank is charged with knowledge that the depositor is
insolvent, does not make the application a preferential
payment. If the deposit is made more than 4 months
before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by the
depositor, the mere exercise by the bank of the right
of setoff, though within this period, or even after the
institution of bankruptcy proceedings, does not constitute a preferential transfer. It seems, generally
speaking, to be immaterial that the debt owing by the
depositor to the bank arose from an overdraft on the
part of the depositor. 9 Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy Sec.
525 (1963) ."
The Supreme Court case of Massey, supra, supports
this rule. Also, the Court is reminded of the above quoted
statement found in 4 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) par.
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60.15 which said in part, " ... were not preferential transfers, even if made while the debtor was insolvent and the
bank had knowledge or notice of the depositor's insolvency."
In the case of In re Wright-Dana Hardware Co., 212
F. 397 (2nd Cir., 1914), the Court discusses a bank's right
of setoff under Section 68 (a) :
"Our attention is called to the fact that the referee
found that the Wright-Dana Company was insolvent
on September 15, 1911 (four months before bankruptcy), and continued to be insolvent to the date of its
adjudication in bankruptcy on February 5, 1912, and
that during the whole of that time the fact of its insolvency was known to the bank. All this may be true
and yet not deprive the bank of its right to set-off. A
bank may do business in the usual manner with one it
knows to be insolvent. The mere fact of insolvency, or
mere knowledge of the insolvency of the depositor, is
not alone sufficient to take away the bank's right of
setoff. Wright-Dana Hardware at 401.
In the case of In re Cummins Const. Corp., 72 F. Supp.
409 (D.C. Md., 1947), the Court said:
If a bank, in the ordinary course of business, receives
deposits from a depositor before and during four
months next preceding such depositor's adjudication
in bankruptcy, and if during such four month period,
with notice that such depositor is in financial difficulties, the bank applies his deposits against his indebtedness to the bank, has the bank thereby received a
voidable preference? The law is very clear that this
question must be answered in the negative. The Supreme Court so decided as early as 1904, in New York
County Bank v. Massey, 192 U. S. 138, 24 S. Ct. 199,
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48 L. Ed. 380, and again in Studley v. Boylston Bank,
229 U.S. 523, 33 S. Ct. 806, 57 L. Ed. 1313. See also
United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 267 U. S.
387, 45 S. Ct. 338, 69 L. Ed. 672 and Citizens National
Bank of Gastonia, N. C. v. Lineberger, a decision of
the Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 45 F.
2d 522. Cummins Const. at 413-14."
POINT V.
THE TRUSTEE HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN
PROVING A VOIDABLE PREFERENCE BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE AND RESPONDENT HAS NOT MET THAT BURDEN.
In the case of Farmer's Bank v. Julian, 383 F. 2d 314
(8th Cir., 1967), which involved a bank's right of setoff,
the Court said that:
The Trustee has the burden of proof of proving a
voidable preference by a preponderance of the evidence. City Nat. Bank v. Slocum, 272 F. 11 (6 Cir.
1921) cert. denied 257 U. S. 637, 42 S. Ct. 49, 66 L.
Ed. 409; Moran Bros., Inc. v. Yinger, 323 F. 2d 699
(10 Cir. 1963). Julian at 324.
The case of Moran Bros., Inc. v. Yinger, 323 F. 2d 699
(10th Cir., 1963), deals with reasonable cause to know of
insolvency under Section 60. The Court held that the trustee
has the burden of proof in establishing a preference and
that there is a presumption of good faith on the part of a
creditor who receives a payment of his debt.
And, finally, as a corollary to the rule imposing the
burden of proof upon the trustee, there is a presump-
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tion of good faith on the part of a creditor who receives a payment of his debt which must be overcome
by evidence of reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor is insolvent. Canright v. General Finance Corporation, & Cir., 123 F. 2d 98; Republic National
Bank of Dallas v. Vial, 5 Cir., 232 F. 2d 785. Yinger
at 702.
In the case of City Nat. Bank v. Slocum, 272 F. n
(6th Cir. 1921), the Court held that the trustee had the
burden of proof in establishing that a transfer of a mortgage was a preferential transfer.
It is submitted to the court that the trustee in the case
on appeal has not met the burden of proof to establish a
preferential transfer. There is no substantial evidence in
the record to show that either the appellant had knowledge
of insolvency or that any of the deposits in question were
made other than in the regular course of business. That
being the case, the bank was completely within its right
in setting off the deposits against the debts owed to the
Bank. Such right of setoff is explicitly allowed under Section 68 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act.

Therefore, the appellant requests that this court reverse the lower court and allow appellant to retain the setoffs that it made.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
reverse the judgment rendered against appellant for the
following reasons:

'
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(a) The receipt of deposits of Wheat Bros. and
the right of setoff exercised by appellant were not
preferential transfers ;
(b) The Bank, through its officers, had no
knowledge and no reasonable cause to believe, that
Wheat Bros. was insolvent at the time the Bank exercised its right of setoff;
( c) The setoff between mutual obligors provided
by Section 68 of the Bankruptcy Act places the transactions between appellant and Wheat Bros. directly in
harmony with existing law, and not subject to avoidance by the trustee; and
(d) Respondent failed to meet its burden of
proof in the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
DON B. ALLEN
M. JOHN ASHTON of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

